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Abstract
We design a protocol for dynamic prioritization of data on shared routers such as untethered
3G/4G devices. The mechanism prioritizes bandwidth in favor of users with the highest value,
and is incentive compatible, so that users can simply report their true values for network access.
A revenue pooling mechanism also aligns incentives for sellers, so that they will choose to
use prioritization methods that retain the incentive properties on the buy-side. In this way, the
design allows for an open architecture. In addition to revenue pooling, the technical contribution
is to identify a class of stochastic demand models and a prioritization scheme that provides
allocation monotonicity. Simulation results confirm efficiency gains from dynamic prioritization
relative to prior methods, as well as the effectiveness of revenue pooling.
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1 Introduction
Many mobile broadband data users overpay for data plans, buying a data plan with sufficient
monthly quota for their maximum needs even though the average consumption is only about 15%
of the monthly quota [1]. Analysis of cell phone data has also shown quota dynamics [2] in users,
i.e., sensitivity to quota balance and time to the end of the quota period. One way to address these
inefficiencies is to allow surplus bandwidth to be shared. In this paper we propose an auction-based
protocol for such bandwidth-sharing. Sellers have wireless broadband (3G/4G) devices with a WiFi
like WLAN radio, and can share network access through tethering apps that allow them to act as
routers. Buyers have WiFi devices and pay sellers to relay their data.
Rather than finding optimal static allocations to users, our focus is on dynamic prioritization
of access to bandwidth. Dynamic prioritization is more efficient because it can handle temporal
heterogeneity in user demand. We design an auction protocol to prioritize network access in favor
of those with highest value. In ensuring simplicity for users, we seek an incentive compatible design,
so that truthful reporting of value and straightforward use of the shared bandwidth (no delaying of
traffic, no padding of traffic) is optimal for a user. Incentive compatibility is also useful in avoiding
“churn” and system overhead that can occur if users can benefit by adapting reported values given
reports of others. Similar arguments have been made in the context of sponsored search markets [7].
Our positive results are stated for users with linear (per-byte) valuation functions. Give this,
incentive compatibility requires that the cumulative quantity of network resources consumed by a
user is non-decreasing in bid value, a property referred to as monotonicity. Our main technical
contribution is to establish conditions on user demand models for which a strict priority-queue
approach to resource access control satisfies monotonicity. An important property satisfied by the
demand models is that a user’s cumulative consumption of network bandwidth over a user session
weakly increases as a function of her total consumption up to any intermediate time. An additional
technical challenge that we address is to ensure that users cannot benefit through delayed use of
allocated network resources, or by introducing fake traffic to increase demand.
Payments are computed by adopting an approach due to Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Slivkins [4]
(bks). This involves adding an additional, random perturbation to bids.1 In a typical auction
setting, the auctioneer knows how an allocation of resources would have changed given different
bids. This counterfactual information is essential to standard payment schemes but unavailable
here. It would require knowledge of how much bandwidth a user would consume under a different
priority, but this requires knowledge that the network infrastructure does not have about a user’s
demand model. The only information available for the purpose of determining payments is the
actual realization of consumption based on the actual assignment of priority. The introduction of
random perturbation by the bks scheme avoids the need for this counterfactual information.
We also extend our design so that it embraces open network architectures. In particular, we
are robust to router devices that can install alternative routing software, for example to change
prioritization schemes, or otherwise tamper with methods to compute payments. Thus, we seek to
align incentives on the sell side as well as the buy side of the market. Our solution adopts lightweight
cryptography and revenue pooling across sellers, and has the effect of aligning the interests of sellers
with adopting routing policies that maximize total buyer value. This is sufficient for monotonicity
of user allocations, which is in turn sufficient for buyer truthfulness. Revenue pooling makes the
market design appear simultaneously as a first-price market for sellers and a second-price market
for buyers. For sellers, this means they prefer to maximize the (bid) value of the allocation. For
buyers, this retains the second-price-like bks scheme, and thus incentive compatibility.
1A side effect is that the scheme does not reduce to fair share in the case of n identical buyers. Rather, the scheme
randomly perturbs each bid before ranking them for the purpose of determining network prioritization.
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A simulation study confirms that the mechanism achieves arbitrarily close approximations to full
allocative efficiency for simple demand models (allocating the shared resource to those who value
it the most), shows that reserve prices can increase efficiency of non-prioritized routing methods,
demonstrates a scenario where sellers have practical efficiency-improving deviations, and examines
the distributional effects of revenue pooling. We have also prototyped our scheme using the traffic
control module in the Linux kernel.
1.1 Related work
Sen et al. [18] provide an exhaustive survey of the large literature on smart data pricing. We focus
on describing work related to the specific techniques that we use.
Babaioff et al. [5] and Devanur et al. [6] show that the unavailability of counterfactuals impedes
the design of truthful mechanisms in the context of multi-armed bandit problems. We employ the
bks scheme in a new application domain. The effect is that the payment scheme that we adopt
accounts for varying user demand, providing an unbiased estimate of the cost imposed on other
buyers by the prioritization associated with a buyer’s device. In contrast, an earlier scheme due to
Varian and Mackie-Mason (VMM) [22] adopts a myopic, per-packet viewpoint on the cost imposed
on other users and is not incentive compatible when buyers have adaptive demand patterns.
Other approaches from dynamic mechanism design are unsuitable, either because they rely on
counterfactual information [10] or rely on a probabilistic demand model [16]. VMM’s work inspired
other approaches, such as the progressive second-price auction [11], and some follow-on work [12].
As with VMM, they also do not achieve incentive alignment in dynamic settings. They also assume
the existence of a trusted router.
Godfrey et al. [8] study incentive compatibility of congestion control mechanisms in networks.
Our technical analysis of the separation between bidders is similar to the separation between flows
in this earlier model, but the domain of study and main results are otherwise incomparable. We
consider user bidding and payments, whereas they analyze the effect of manipulations in forwarding
strategies on network-wide congestion.
In a different domain, Shneidman and Parkes [21] study the problem of faithful network protocols
for BGP routing, where the algorithms adopted by network users must themselves form part of
an equilibrium. In this sense, our revenue pooling scheme attains faithfulness with respect seller
routing algorithms.
Also related is a large literature on the use of cryptographic solutions to provide trustworthy
auctions; e.g. [15]. However, these solutions incur too much overhead in the context of dynamic
bandwidth prioritization. Porter and Shoham [17] provide an analysis of how the presence of
cheating provides a second-price auction with first-price semantics. Our revenue pooling scheme,
used for aligning trust does the opposite: we give a second-price auction first-price semantics
from the perspective of the auctioneer (or seller, in our model), thereby mitigating incentives for
manipulation; the scheme borrows ideas from a random-sampling approach used in a very different
domain, that of the design of revenue-optimal digital good auctions [9].
2 Model
In this section we describe our model, also shown in Fig. 1.
Time and value: Time is modeled in discrete epochs. Each buyer (agent) i has an allocation
period [αi, βi], with αi ≥ 0 and βi ≥ αi. This is the period of time over which the buyer associates
value with receiving bandwidth. Each buyer has constant value vi ≥ 0 per byte (a linear valuation),
and bids once before sending data.
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Figure 1: Illustration of our model.
Routing: We adopt a flow model of traffic, with a single flow modeling both upstream and
downstream traffic for each buyer. The router’s link to the Internet is assumed to have fixed
capacity c > 0. Each buyer has bid bi ≥ 0, and receives a priority based on this reported value.
We consider three schemes for network prioritization:
1. First-in First-out (fifo) routes data in a first-in, first-out order as it arrives at the router.
Since we do not model the queue of a router directly, we model fifo as a within-epoch allocation
proportional to within-epoch demand.
2. Fair queueing (fq) allocates bandwidth to all buyers evenly, dividing any unused capacity
recursively: in each period, each of the n buyers is guaranteed to be able to consume c/n. Any un-
used capacity is divided evenly among buyers with further demand, and this repeats until everyone
is satisfied or capacity is exhausted.
3. Strict Priority Queueing (spq) first allocates capacity to the buyer with the highest bid in
each epoch, up to c or the demand of the buyer. Then, capacity is allocated to the buyer with the
second highest bid, and so forth, as long as capacity is available. Ties are broken at random.
Let ci,t denote the network capacity available to buyer i in epoch t (this depends on her bid, as
well as the bid and network usage of others.)
Transport: We assume that the local network between router and buyers is much faster than
the router’s link to the Internet and neglect delays there.
Demand: Let xi,t (bytes) denote the cumulative amount of traffic (upload or download)
associated with buyer i up to and including time t. This may be smaller than the total capacity
available to buyer i up to and including time t because it depends on the buyer’s demand.
Let Di(t, x) (bytes) denote the demand of buyer i during epoch t, where x is the cumulative
amount of traffic (upload or download) used so far; i.e., x = xi,t−1. Equivalently, this represents the
maximum amount of network capacity that buyer i wants to consume during the epoch. Di(t, x)
is a random variable, and we adopt di(t, x) to denote a specific realization. We consider demand
models Di that satisfy the following condition:
2
2Conceptually, we can think about the demand for all (t, x) values as being realized by “nature” when a buyer
arrives, capturing the type of the buyer (even if it is unknown to the buyer.)
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Definition 1. A demand model Di(t, x) is natural if all realizations di(t, x) satisfy for all t, for
all x ≥ x′ and all c ≥ 0:
x+ min(c, di(t, x)) ≥ x′ + min(c, di(t, x′)).
A demand model is natural when getting more capacity earlier might increase demand in the
future, and should not decrease future demand below the total amount given lower capacity. In
presenting some examples of demand models that are natural in this sense, we focus on deterministic
examples. Randomized models can be created through random perturbations to the parameters of
the example, and also through randomization over the different kinds of models.
Constant demand: A buyer i who simply wants to send at some constant rate: di(t, x) = k.
Time-varying demand: A buyer i with an arbitrary time-dependent generation process g(t) that
generates data that must be sent immediately to be useful: di(t, x) = g(t).
Buffered demand: A buyer i with an arbitrary time-dependent generation process g(t) that
generates data, and wants to send as much of that as possible, buffering demand until it is allocated:
di(t, x) =
∑
p≤t g(p)− x.
Impatient buyer: A buyer i who sends until time p, and then goes away if some minimum
amount of service m has not been met:
di(t, x) =

k if t ≤ p
k if t > p and x > m
0 else
This can be generalized to multiple thresholds, reduction to a lower, but non-zero rate, etc.
Increasing demand (in rate) A buyer that has di(t, x) = g(x/t), with g weakly increasing.
Increasing demand (in total) A buyer that has di(t, x) = g(x), with g weakly increasing.
This impatient buyer model illustrates that the requirement of ”natural” demand functions
allow those users to be modeled whose future value for network access falls if they don’t receive
enough bandwidth.
These demand models capture many realistic types of demand, but some demand functions do
not fit our model. In particular, we do not allow demand to depend on recent usage, precluding
models like “if I have not been able to use the network in the last 30 seconds, give up”.
3 Prioritization and Payments
Having introduced the basic elements of our model, we now describe some variations on payment
schemes.
3.1 Fixed price
A baseline comparison is provided by a fixed price payment scheme. This can be used together with
the fifo and fq routing policies, where only the users who bid above the fixed price are considered
by the prioritization schemes.
3.2 VMM mechanism
The vmm mechanism provides a second comparison point. This mechanism uses the spq routing
policy. For payments, the original paper by Varian and Mackie-Mason used a per-packet model,
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and charged the owner of each forwarded packet the immediate externality imposed by the packet.
This is the value of the highest value packet that was dropped while the forwarded packet was in
the router’s queue.
Since we do not model the router queue directly, we adapt the idea behind the payment mech-
anism to our flow-based model by charging the immediate externality imposed by a buyer’s flow
in each period, computed using the standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (vcg) mechanism, charging
V−i − V ∗−i for each buyer i in each period, where V−i is the total (reported) value to all the other
buyers in the (counterfactual) optimal allocation when i is removed, and V ∗−i is the total (reported)
value to all the other buyers in the real optimal allocation with i included.
vmm is a natural mechanism, and has inspired a lot of work on bandwidth pricing. However,
the vmm approach is not incentive compatible in a setting with variable demand. Consider the
following:
Example 1. Suppose that the router link capacity is 1 packet per second, and there is one
buyer with value $3 per packet who wants to send one packet every second and a second buyer with
value $2 per packet who wants to send a single packet, and keeps trying until she succeeds. Truthful
bidding by buyer 1 will result in the second buyer’s packet being dropped every period, and a charge
of $2 for each packet, representing the per-epoch externality on buyer 2. On the other hand, a bid
of less than $2 would “flush” the packet of buyer 2 and then allow buyer 1 to send for the remaining
epochs with payment $0. The tradeoff is to reduce the amount of data forwarded by 1 packet in
return for a significant reduction in total payment.
3.3 The BKS Mechanism
In the example above, vmm over-estimates the externality because it does not have access to the
information that buyer 2 only has a single packet to send. This information is not available, since
we assume that demand models are not described by users or known by the prioritization scheme.
In fact, even the user themselves may not know their future demand before it is realized.
In this domain, the bks mechanism adopts the spq routing policy. Payments are determined
following a self-sampling approach, where a randomized perturbation to bids obviates the need for
counterfactual information. The idea is to obtain an estimate of the network resources that a user
would have consumed at some lower bid as a side-effect of the randomization.
We adapt the scheme to also allow the seller to employ a reserve price r ≥ 0, which is the
minimal per-byte price a seller will accept.3 The scheme is parameterized by µ ∈ (0, 1), which
governs the probability of introducing a random perturbation into bids.
The scheme is most easily explained in terms of an allocation rule A. For us, this encapsulates
the combined effect of realized demand (including possible strategic effects by users delaying demand
or creating fake demand), the routing policy, the total capacity constraint on the router, and user
bids. Taken together, these elements define the total amount of traffic consumed by each user
(equivalently, the realized allocation).
The allocationA(b˜, d) generated by the rule is ex ante uncertain—it depends on realized demand
d = (d1, . . . , dn), where di denotes the realized demand by i in each epoch, and is applied to
randomly perturbed bids b˜. The bks payment scheme works as follows:
Definition 2 (bks). Given an allocation rule A and a parameter µ ∈ (0, 1), the bks procedure in
our setting is:
3To support the reserve price, we use the h-canonical self-resampling procedure described by bks, with h(z, b) =
r + z(b − r), which has distribution function Fh(a, b) = (a − r)/(b − r). In Section 3.4, the bks paper claims that
Fh = F0 for all h, where F0 is the distribution function for the canonical resampling procedure, but F0 doesn’t satisfy
their condition on Fh: h(Fh(a, b), b) = a for all a, b ∈ I, a < b. Fh(a, b) = (a− r)/(b− r) does satisfy this condition.
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1. Upon arrival, each bidder i submits a bid bi ≥ r.
2. The mechanism computes transformed bids b˜i ∀ i:
(a) With probability 1− µ, b˜i = bi
(b) Else, compute a reduced bid: pick γ ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random, and set b˜i = r+ (bi−
r) · γ1/(1−µ)
3. For all epochs, the router uses the allocation rule A(d, b˜) applied to the transformed bids b˜ of
the active users and given realized demand d = (d1, . . . , dn).
4. Given the amount of network data, xi ≥ 0, associated with each user i, (as realized by the
allocation rule A applied to transformed bids), collect payment from user i as:
(a) Collect bixi.
(b) If b˜i < bi, give a rebate Ri =
1
µ(xi(bi − r)). Otherwise, Ri = 0.
Bids are perturbed, used for prioritized routing, the total number of bytes associated with a
user is observed, and payments are made through a randomized adjustment via the rebate in step
4. Each user’s rebate can be determined at the end of her allocation period, allowing the user’s
payment to be computed while other users are still active.
Definition 3. A mechanism is truthful-in-expectation if a risk-neutral buyer maximizes expected
utility by bidding truthfully, whatever the bids of others, where the expectation is taken with
respect to random coin flips of the mechanism.
An essential property for truthfulness is the ex post monotonicity of the allocation rule.
Let Ai(b′, d) denote the allocation to buyer i given some bid vector b′ and demand vector d. (We
write b′ to denote a generic bid vector and avoid confusion with the b submitted as input to bks.)
An allocation rule is ex post monotone if Ai(b′′, d) ≥ Ai(b′, d), for all bid vectors b′, all demand
vectors d, and all b′′ = (b′1, . . . , b′′i , . . . , b
′
n) such that b
′′
i > b
′
i. This is ex post in the sense that
whatever the bids and whatever the demand, a buyer’s total traffic consumption weakly increases
with her bid. We use the following result:
Theorem 3.1. Applying the bks procedure with probability of perturbation µ to an allocation rule
that is ex post monotone results in a truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
The proof in [4] shows that the scheme obtains an unbiased sample of an integral that defines
the payment rule in the canonical approach of incentive-compatible mechanism design [13]. The
allocation is the same as in the original allocation rule with probability at least 1− nµ, where n is
the number of buyers.
Example 2. Let’s revisit the earlier example of manipulation in the vmm scheme. Under bks,
when the first buyer’s bid is not resampled, she pays $3 per packet, and has some total allocation k.
When her bid is resampled, the first buyer will have allocation k or k−1, depending on whether the
resampled bid was below $2. This will result in a large rebate, and in expectation, the first buyer’s
total payment will be essentially $2, with the exact value depending on µ.
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4 Buyer incentives
To establish truthfulness of the bks mechanism in our setting we need to show that spq combined
with natural demand models implies that the allocation rule is ex post monotone. In our setting,
the allocation rule is the process that determines the total network traffic used by each buyer over
her allocation period.
We first show that spq provides an isolation property on buyers, and then analyze the mono-
tonicity of our allocation rule.
Lemma 4.1 (isolation). For any t, capacity ci,t under spq is independent of how capacity is used
by buyer i in time < t, and weakly increases with bid bi.
Proof. Consider n buyers, and order them by bids b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bn with ties broken at random.
Let’s first consider the claim that capacity ci,t in epoch t is independent of how the capacity is used
by buyer i in earlier epochs. Proceed by strong induction. For buyer 1, then this is immediate since
the buyer always gets to use full the capacity of the channel. For buyer i > 1, given the induction
hypothesis for buyers < i, buyer i cannot affect demand or allocation to higher priority buyers and
is not affected by the use of the capacity by lower priority buyers. The result is that buyer i gets all
capacity that is unused by the higher priority buyers. The capacity ci,t is weakly increasing with
bid value because of spq routing. In particular, if buyer i > 1 gets a higher priority i′ < i then
her capacity in period t will be the capacity unused by all buyers i′′ < i′, whereas previously its
capacity was that unused by all buyers i′′ < i.
Given this lemma, we can now focus on an arbitrary buyer i, and simplify notation by omitting
the subscript i. In particular, we use dt to denote the realized demand of the buyer in period
t (keeping the dependence on total network capacity used so far silent), and ct to denote the
buyer’s realized capacity. Both dt and ct are realizations of a random process (the latter due
to its dependence on the demand models of other buyers.) We first establish monotonicity and
truthfulness properties of the mechanism under the assumption that the buyer is greedy in her use
of the channel.
Definition 4. Given realized capacity ct and demand dt in epoch t, a buyer using the greedy policy
sends min(ct, dt) to the router in epoch t.
The greedy policy stipulates that the buyer makes her demand dt available to the router (up
to capacity ct), and neither pads the demand with fake traffic nor hides demand by introducing a
delay.
Lemma 4.2 (monotonicity). If buyer i’s demand model is natural and routing is done using spq,
then fixing bids of other buyers and realized demand, buyer i’s allocation up to and including any
epoch t under the greedy policy is ex post monotone in bid value bi.
Proof. The proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. If routing is done using spq and the demand function is natural, then for any t,
bid values and realized demand, following the greedy policy in every period up to and including t
maximizes the total amount of network capacity used by the buyer, xt, up to and including period
t.
Proof. We proceed by induction on t. By fixing bid values and fixing realized demand we have
isolation. The base case is simple: if t = 1 then using less than min(c1, d1) for any c1, d1 does not
maximize x1.
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Consider t > 1. Suppose for contradiction that there is some natural demand function d and
realization of capacity c such that using min(cp, dp) in every epoch p ≤ t does not maximize xt.
Let f be a sequence of usage amounts that does maximize xt.
If ft < min(ct, dt), setting ft = min(ct, dt) increases the allocation in epoch t and thus the total
amount consumed, contradicting the fact that f maximizes xt.
If ft = min(ct, dt), then there exists some p < t such that fp < min(cp, dp). Let xt−1 be the total
amount used up to and including epoch t−1 under f . Consider a sequence f ′ of usage amounts that
is greedy for all epochs ≤ t, and let x′t−1 be the total used up to and including t− 1 under f ′. By
the induction hypothesis, f ′ maximizes the amount used up to and including t− 1, so x′t−1 ≥ xt−1.
Because the demand function d is natural,
x′t = x
′
t−1 + d(t, x
′
t−1) ≥ xt−1 + d(t, xt−1) = xt,
so f ′ is indeed a maximizing sequence, establishing a contradiction.
Using this lemma, we obtain Lemma 4.2. Suppose otherwise. Then it would be the case that
following the greedy policy and using the capacity cp in every epoch p ≤ t leads to a smaller
allocation by epoch t than using the greedy policy and using the capacity c′p where c′p ≤ cp for all
p ≤ t (and ct is the capacity under a higher bid bi > b′i, with this relationship between c′t and ct
following from Lemma 4.1). But this is a contradiction with Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.4. If the buyer is restricted to the greedy policy, her demand is natural, and routing
is done using spq then the bks mechanism is truthful and the dominant strategy is to submit a
truthful bid bi = vi.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 4.2 and the properties of bks in Theorem 3.1.
But we are also want to show that users cannot benefit by delaying network usage, or padding
traffic with fake packets.
Theorem 4.5. Given spq routing and natural demand, the dominant strategy of a user in the bks
mechanism is to bid its true value and follow the greedy policy.
Proof. We first consider padding with fake traffic in some epochs. In particular, consider the final
epoch t in which the buyer does this, and for it to matter assume dt < ct. Fix any bid value
bi (perhaps untruthful). We establish that this weakly increases the buyer’s expected payment
without providing additional value (since it is fake traffic.) The expected payment in bks is equal
(through the self-sampling approach) to the Myerson payment, and thus by the Myerson [13] rule,
we require
bix
′
i(bi)−
∫ bi
0
wx′i(w)dw ≥ bixi(bi)−
∫ bi
0
wxi(w)dw,
where x′i(w) is the total allocation given bid w with the padding in epoch t and xi(w) is the total
allocation given bid w without padding in epoch t. This inequality holds since x′i(bi) − xi(bi) ≥
x′i(w) − xi(w) for all w ≤ bi, since for lower values the buyer may at some point receive a lower
priority at t and thus be able to send less incremental traffic through padding, from which we have,
bi(x
′
i(bi)− xi(bi)) ≥
∫ bi
0
w
(
x′i(w)− xi(w)
)
dw.
10
Second, consider holding back demand in some epochs such that not all the capacity is utilized.
Now that padding of demand has been precluded, it follows from monotonicity with respect to bid
value, and the truthfulness of BKS, that it is a weakly dominant strategy for a user to bid her
true per-byte value. Moreover, since the expected payment in BKS is equal to the payments in
the Myerson auction, then vix
∗z∗ ≥ vix′z′ for all alternate allocations x′ ≤ x∗ obtained through
demand reduction, where x∗ is the allocation achieved under the greedy policy, and z∗ and z′ the
expected payment in BKS at allocation x∗ and x′ respectively. From this, it follows immediately
that the buyer cannot benefit by holding back demand.
On this basis, we conclude that the bks mechanism has the “truthful in expectation” property
in that it supports both truthful bidding and also straightforward revelation of demand (and use
of the capacity made available through spq applied to perturbed bids).
5 Sell-side incentives
We have assumed so far that the seller and router device can be trusted; e.g., to follow spq and bks
pricing. However, a self-interested seller can do better by deviating from the scheme as currently
described. This is a concern because it would also lead buy-side incentives to unravel. For example,
consider the following profitable seller manipulations, and the failure of simple fixes:
(1) The simplest profitable manipulation for sellers is to simply never give rebates, justifying
this by claiming that the randomized bid resampling in bks just happened to work out that way.
A natural fix to this is to insist that the seller send the signed bids to a trusted central server for
resampling. The central server would now know whether a buyer should pay her bid or get a rebate
for a particular allocation, and since the server handles the accounting, it could appropriately credit
or debit the buyer’s account when it learned the final allocation.
(2) If the seller cannot tamper with the bid resampling process, it can still manipulate by
reducing the allocation to resampled bidders, since they will be getting rebates and giving them
service will reduce the seller’s revenue. A partial fix to this is to note that to implement spq, the
seller only needs to know the priority order of bidders, and not their bids, so bids can be encrypted
when sent to the central server, which would report just the order to the router, keeping the seller
ignorant of the bids.
(3) Unfortunately, the seller can still infer enough from the order to manipulate, even in a single
allocation period. We omit the math here, but it can be shown that the expected revenue from the
lowest priority user is negative, so the seller would have an incentive to reduce the user’s allocation.
To preclude such manipulations, we propose a combination of lightweight cryptographic methods
and incentive engineering. In particular, we take advantage of the presence of multiple sellers in
envisioned applications. Precisely, we need enough sellers that share the same reserve price.
The approach, align-trust, extends the bks scheme described so far, using a trusted central
server for accounting and validation, logically inserting it between the buyer and seller. Buyers
pay the center directly, and the center pools the revenue across sellers in a particular way, making
payments to sellers that address incentive concerns.
We do not assume that the central server can observe or enforce anything about the sellers’
routing policy. We merely rely on it to verify the cryptographic signatures on buyer bids to ensure
that sellers cannot tamper with bids, to keep track of account balances for buyers and sellers, and
to verify that bid perturbation is done correctly. We explain the approach in the next section.
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5.1 The Align-Trust mechanism
bks specifies that sellers should route packets using a highest-resampled-bid-first policy. One way
to think about the problem with seller incentives in bks is that prioritizing in favor of buyers
with resampled bids has negative value to sellers. (Recall that a bid is only resampled with some
probability µ.) We fix this by first paying sellers the perturbed bid value for data, rather than the
rebate-adjusted, perturbed bid amount. From the seller’s perspective, this makes the auction have
“first price” semantics, and aligns incentives.
Because the bks mechanism also pays rebates to buyers, just paying the sellers based on per-
turbed bid amounts would leave the center with a deficit. Instead, we compensate by taxing the
sellers a percentage of their revenue. We ensure that sellers can only reduce their individual tax
rate by improving efficiency, so sellers maximize revenue by routing to maximize efficiency (i.e.,
total value) with respect to the resampled bids, which we establish is sufficient to retain incentives
on the buy-side of the market.
For the purpose of align-trust, we assume time is divided into accounting periods, perhaps
a month long in practice. These periods encapsulate many bks style auctions, as various sellers
provide bandwidth to buyers.
Recall that bks allows a seller to adopt a reserve price to increase revenue. To align trust on
the sell-side, we insist that each seller selects a reserve price from a small set of reserve prices.
Based on this, we can now consider the pool of sellers that select the same reserve price. We
apply the following system-wide payment mechanism for the auctions involving these sellers:
Definition 5 (align-trust). Consider an accounting period, and a set of sellers M with the same
reserve price. Let Γ(s) be the set of buyers served by seller s during the accounting period.
1. Charge each buyer the bks payment bixi −Ri for each completed auction. Credit each seller
s ∈M the first-price revenue at the perturbed bids, without including the rebates: ∑i∈Γ(s) xib˜i.
2. Randomly split the sellers in M into two disjoint sets S1, S2 of equal size. Let
C1 =
∑
s∈S1
∑
i∈Γ(s)
xi(b˜i − r)
denote the total credit above reserve price to sellers in S1. Let
T1 =
∑
s∈S1
∑
i∈Γ(s)
(bi − r)xi −Ri
denote the total above-reserve payments from buyers associated with S1. Define C2 and T2
similarly for sellers in S2. Because the payments from buyers include the bks rebates, and
the credits to sellers are at the first-price resampled bids b˜, this leaves the center with a deficit
δ = C − T for each set.
3. To make up the deficit, the center will tax the sellers. Define the tax rate for each set as:
tax 1 =
δ2
C1
, tax 2 =
δ1
C2
. Collect tax 1C1 from sellers in S1, charging tax rate tax 1 uniformly
across all sellers. Collect tax 2C2 from sellers in S2, charging tax rate tax 2 uniformly across
all sellers.
This construction has several nice properties. First of all, as long as sellers continue to use spq
it has no effect on buyer incentives, because align-trust is identical to bks from the buyer’s point
of view. In addition, we have:
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Lemma 5.1. The total payment in align-trust is exactly balanced.
Proof. The reserve price payments effectively go directly from buyers to sellers. The total above-
reserve payment to the system is T1 − C1 + T2 − C2 + tax 1C1 + tax 2C2 = 0
A tax rate is admissible if it is no greater than one. This will be true with high probability
when no seller accounts for a large fraction of rebates, as shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 5.2. The probability that the tax rate to a seller is greater than 1 falls exponentially
quickly in the number of sellers, when the payments made to each seller in step 1 are independently
distributed according to one of a finite set of distributions with bounded support.4 We call this
assumption about the payment distribution the admissibility condition.
Proof. Suppose for convenience that the pool contains 2m sellers, and let X1, . . . , Xm denote a
random variable for the above-reserve credit made in step 1 to each of the sellers in S1. Similarly,
let Y1, . . . , Ym denote a random variable for the total above-reserve credit made in step 1 to each
of the sellers in S2.
Let’s consider tax 1. For this to be bounded above by 1, we need
C2 − T2 ≤ C1
Dividing through by m, and writing C2/m = Y (where Y is the empirical mean), C1/m = X
(where X is the empirical mean), and with T2/m = z > 0, we want to bound the probability
Pr(Y −X ≤ z). For this, it is sufficient to bound the probability that
Y − E[Y ] ≤ z
2
and E[X]−X ≤ z
2
,
since in this case we have Y − X ≤ z, since E[X] = E[Y ] by assumption. The probability
Pr(Y − E[Y ] > z2), falls exponentially quickly in z and m by Hoeffding’s inequality, and similarly
for Pr(E[X]−X > z2). This completes the proof.
We assume that the admissibility condition holds for the theoretical results that follow.
In addition, from a seller’s viewpoint, align-trust transforms the mechanism into a first-price
auction (with respect to perturbed bids) with a tax collected on revenue, where the seller cannot
usefully manipulate his tax rate:
Lemma 5.3. If the tax rate for a seller is weakly less than one, the seller’s strict preference is to
allocate in order to maximize the total value given perturbed bids.
Proof. Consider a seller s in S1. The tax rate for s is
δ2
C1
. δ2 depends only on sellers in S2, and C1
is the sum of the revenues of other sellers in S1, which s cannot affect, and the total revenue for
s. Increasing revenue lowers the tax rate facing s, so as long as the tax rate is less than 1, this is
doubly good for s.5
4These distributions correspond to the types of situations in which sellers operate: occasionally sharing access in
cafes, running a permanent hotspot in an area without wi-fi infrastructure, frequent sharing at a conference facility,
etc. It is reasonable to divide sellers into a finite set of such environment types, with random variability within each.
5In practice, it would make sense to cap the tax rate at 1, putting the risk on the center instead of the sellers.
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5.2 Seller Incentives
Under align-trust, seller incentives are aligned with using a routing policy that maximizes total
pre-tax revenue
∑
i b˜ixi. This follows from Lemma 5.3. In this section, we examine the effect that
this has on whether sellers want to follow spq, and on the effect of potential deviations on buy-side
incentives.
First, we characterize situations where sellers cannot profit by deviating from spq. Second, we
look at situations when the seller may profit from using a different routing policy, and show that
such deviations improve efficiency with respect to perturbed bids and preserve incentive alignment
with truthful bidding for buyers. The crucial property that we need to retain under seller deviations
is that of monotonicity, or a relaxed form of expected monotonicity.
5.2.1 Demand models where spq is optimal
We first consider cases where the seller’s selfish preference is to follow spq. The intuition is that
deviating results in an immediate drop in revenue from sending lower priority traffic ahead of higher
priority traffic, so in order for this to increase revenue, the seller has to expect to make up the lost
revenue later. If this is not possible under a given demand model then spqis optimal for the seller.
In the following, we consider ex post efficiency, which requires that an allocation rule maximizes
total realized value whatever the bids and whatever the realized demand. The following lemma
follows from Lemma 5.3, given admissibility.
Lemma 5.4. If spq is ex post efficient (with respect to perturbed bids), the seller cannot increase
his revenue by deviating from spq.
We now specialize the natural demand models to understand when spq will be ex post efficient.
A sufficient property is that the demand model be memoryless, so that it does not depend on the
routing policy, with demand invariant to the total allocation made so far: di(t, x) = di(t, y) for all
x, y and for all realizations of a user’s random demand model. spq is greedy in regard to bid, and
if there is no impact on future demand from a deviation from myopic value maximization in the
current period then spq will maximize realized value, so applying Lemma 5.4 gives the following:
Theorem 5.5. If the user demand models are memoryless, then the seller maximizes revenue by
using spq, and the bks mechanism combined with align-trust retains truthfulness-in-expectation
for buyers despite seller self-interest.
Note that memoryless demand models are natural in the sense of our earlier definition.
5.2.2 Other Demand Models
The seller can benefit by deviating from spq for some natural demand models. For example,
consider the model of an impatient buyer, as in the example in Section 2. Such a buyer will stop
transmitting if it does not get some minimum amount of traffic by some time. If the seller knows
this, it can sometimes increase revenue by increasing the buyer’s priority, increasing her allocation
over the minimum, and ensuring continuing transmission and continuing revenue.
We first consider the extreme case in which the seller can form a perfect prediction of the future
demand and bid values. Let ∆ denote a set of routing policies considered by the seller, and let
xi(ρ) be the total allocation to i under routing policy ρ, given the realized demand of all buyers.
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Lemma 5.6. If the seller implements the optimal routing policy in ∆, maximizing
argmax
ρ∈∆
∑
i
b˜ixi(ρ),
with respect to perturbed bids b˜, then the implied allocation rule is ex post monotone and the resulting
mechanism is truthful-in-expectation for buyers.
Proof. The optimal allocation rule is ex post monotone. To see this, consider the optimal allocation
x = (x1, . . . , xn), denoting the total amount of capacity used by each buyer by her departure,
based on perturbed bids b˜ = (b˜1, . . . , b˜n). Consider an alternate (perturbed) value b˜
′
i > b˜i, and new
optimal allocation x′. Since both x and x′ are available at bids b˜ and (b˜′i, b˜−i), then by optimality
we have:
b˜ixi + B˜−i(x−i) ≥ b˜ix′i + B˜−i(x′−i)
b˜′ix
′
i + B˜−i(x
′
−i) ≥ b˜′ixi + B˜−i(x−i),
where B˜−i(x−i) is the total (perturbed) bid for the allocation x−i to all buyers except i. Adding
and collecting terms, we have
b˜′i(x
′
i − xi) ≥ b˜i(x′i − xi),
and since b˜′i > b˜i we need x
′
i ≥ xi. This is the condition for ex post monotonicity, and completes
the proof.
This illustrates the basic way in which the use of align-trust aligns incentives for sellers so
that they act in a way that retains buy-side truthfulness.
The assumption that the seller is computing the ex post optimal allocation with respect to
realized demand and realized bids is very strong, and can be relaxed. Rather than ex post monotone,
a weaker property of monotone-in-expectation requires the expected total amount of bandwidth
used by a buyer to be weakly increasing with bid value. The expectation is taken with respect to
a probabilistic model of demand and bid values and also considering the random perturbation of
bids in bks.
The dominant-strategy equilibrium property for buyers no longer holds for this seller devia-
tion, because the optimality of the seller’s policy holds only in expectation, given distributional
assumptions about other buyers. In its place, we adopt the standard notion of Bayes-Nash incen-
tive compatibility, which in our case requires that truthful bidding and following the greedy policy
maximizes a buyer’s expected utility, given that other buyers do the same.
Theorem 5.7. If the seller implements a routing policy that is optimal in expectation, solving
argmax
ρ∈∆
∑
i
E
[
b˜ixi,≥t(ρ)
]
,
forward from any time t, where xi,≥t(ρ) is the total additional allocation (bytes) to i between t
and the departure time of i, given perturbed bids b˜, then the resulting mechanism is Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible.
Proof. Consider buyer i and arrival period t = αi. By the expected optimality of the routing policy,
(where the expectation is taken with respect to the probabilistic demand model of buyers and a
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distribution on perturbed bid values, itself induced by the bks randomization and a distribution
on buyer values), we have
b˜izi + B˜−i(z−i,≥t) ≥ b˜iz′i + B˜−i(z′−i,≥t)
b˜′iz
′
i + B˜−i(z
′
−i,≥t) ≥ b˜′izi + B˜−i(z−i,≥t),
where zi is the expected allocation to buyer i forward from t given perturbed bid b˜i, z−i,≥t the
expected allocation to other buyers forward from t, B˜−i(·) denotes the expected value from this
allocation given realized, perturbed bids reported so far and the distribution on future (perturbed)
bids, b˜′i > b˜i is an alternate bid, and z
′
i and z
′
−i,≥t denote the respective allocation quantities under
this alternate bid.
Proceeding in the same way as Lemma 5.6, we can add and collect terms and obtain
b˜′i(z
′
i − zi) ≥ b˜i(z′i − zi),
and conclude since b˜′i > b˜i that z
′
i ≥ zi. This is the condition for monotone-in-expectation. From
this, it then follows from the standard bks incentive arguments (that in turn rely on monotonicity)
that the mechanism aligns incentives for buyers, with Bayes-Nash equilibrium adopted in place of
truthful-in-expectation since monotonicity relies on the other buyers following the equilibrium, so
that the seller’s probabilistic model about the world is correct in regard to demand and bids.
The weakening from truthfulness-in-expectation to Bayes-Nash equilibrium arises because the
seller’s policy is only optimal-in-expectation, and this in turn relies on the seller having a correct
probabilistic model of buyer demand— and thus equilibrium behavior by buyers.
Example 3. An example to illustrate this idea: imagine a case where the seller knows that a
buyer is impatient, with constant demand 10 in each round for the first 60 rounds, leaving after that
if they do not get a minimum amount m, drawn uniformly from [300, 450]. There is no uncertainty
about this buyer’s demand, and the seller computes his best estimates of the other buyers’ future
demand. Using these estimates, the seller can compute the probability that this buyer will reach
each amount between 300 and 450 under spq routing. Then it can consider switching the routing
order in some rounds to increase the buyer’s allocation, and consider how much that increases
the likelihood of the buyer making it to her (unknown) m and the likely future gains from that,
versus the immediate revenue reduction such a deviation requires. The intuition for why this is still
monotone should be clear— if the buyer’s traffic is worth more, there is a smaller revenue reduction
from increasing her priority, and a larger potential future payoff, so the seller would be more likely
to increase the buyer’s allocation.
Buyers do not need to know whether the seller is using spq or an expected-efficiency maximizing
policy, since bks remains monotone, and thus incentives are aligned with truthful bidding either
way. The buyer only needs to believe that the seller is not irrationally reducing his expected revenue
by changing priorities away from spq. Another useful property is that these results hold for any
set of routing policies ∆ considered by the router— as long as the router always chooses the best
policy (in expectation) from a fixed set, we still get monotonicity, and thus buyer truthfulness.
6 Simulation Results
We now present simulations that explore the quantitative difference between mechanisms, and
illustrate the effects predicted by our theoretical analysis. We confirm that bks achieves arbitrarily
close approximations to allocative efficiency for simple demand models, show that reserve prices can
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Figure 2: Sample demand realization for 3 buyers with our trace-inspired model for 600 simulated
secs. Each color is a buyer’s demand.
increase efficiency of non-prioritized routing methods, demonstrate a scenario where sellers have
practical efficiency-improving deviations, and examine the distributional effects of revenue pooling.
6.1 Our simulator
We adopt a custom flow-level simulator, closely matching our theoretical model. Each epoch is
one second, and we run simulations for 10 minutes, or 600 epochs. Demand and capacity are
specified in KBps. The simulator supports arbitrary user demand models. We use a stochastic
demand model motivated by patterns observed in real networks, somewhat simplifying the trace-
based model described in [14]. A user’s demand is composed of flows with total demand equal to
the sum of the demands of the flows active at any time, flow arrival times are a Poisson process,
flow duration is sampled from a lognormal distribution, and each flow has Poisson demand.
We use the following parameters: flow durations have both mean and standard deviation 30
seconds, average flow inter-arrival times are 30 seconds, and each flow has average rate of either 10
or 30 KBps, as specified. This results in average demand equal to the average flow rate.
Fig. 2 shows an example demand trace of three such buyers, each with demand 10 KBps. The
pattern is bursty both at short timescales, reflecting the Poisson demand of each flow, and at longer
timescales, reflecting the random flow arrival process.
The simulator supports the spq, fq, and fifo routing policies described in Section 2. Unless
otherwise specified, we simulate vmm with spq routing, bks with spq routing with priorities based
on resampled bids, and fixed price with fq and fifo routing. The bks resampling frequency µ is 0.2,
chosen as a compromise between reducing the magnitude of rebates and not sacrificing efficiency.
The results are not very sensitive to the choice of µ. We show the expected allocation over 1000
allocations for bks.
We simulate truthful bidding for both bks and vmm, even though vmm is not a truthful mech-
anism. For memoryless demand models, this means that vmm results in the optimal allocation,
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Figure 3: Efficiency of routing policies with truthful bidding. The vmm allocation is optimal in
this setting, so the drop to bks is the efficiency loss due to bid resampling necessary to obtain
truthfulness. spq routing for vmm and bks is much more efficient than the non-prioritized routing
policies.
acting as a benchmark for the truthful mechanisms.
6.2 Efficiency
From our analysis, we know that spq is efficient for memoryless demand models, but may not be
efficient for other demand models. Here, we look at both cases, and look at the magnitude of this
effect in some scenarios. We also examine the drop in efficiency due to bid resampling in bks.
Fig. 3 shows the social welfare (sum of buyer and seller utilities) for a scenario with three buyers.
The first two have per-KB values 10 and 4, and average demand 10 KBps each, simulating a high
value and a medium value user. The last buyer has a per-KB value of only 1, but has a higher
average demand–30 KBps. All buyers use the stochastic demand model described above, and we
compare four different mechanisms–bks and vmm, both with spq routing and truthful bids, and
fq and fifo, with a fixed price of 1. (We study the effect of changing this fixed price in the next
experiment). As the seller capacity increases, the social welfare increases for all the mechanisms,
until all the demand is satisfied. The demand models in this simulation are memoryless, so spq
routing for vmm is optimal given that we insist on truthful bidding.
The small difference between the performance of vmm and bks is the efficiency cost of the
sampling necessary for the truthfulness provided by bks. spq routing for bks is much more efficient
than either of the non-prioritized fixed price policies. The difference between fq and fifo is also
interesting–with fifo, the allocation is proportional to demand, so the low value, high-demand
buyer gets three-fifth of the channel on average, reducing efficiency.
Fig. 4 shows the effect of reserve price on efficiency, in the same scenario, with seller capacity
fixed at 25 KBps. Raising the reserve price slightly to avoid allocating to the lowest value buyer
improves efficiency for fifo and fq. Since vmm and bks naturally prioritize high value data, raising
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Figure 4: Efficiency of routing policies as reserve prices varies. Seller capacity is 25 KBps. Increasing
the reserve price improves the efficiency of fq and fifo.
the reserve price removes opportunities to
We now look at a case where a seller can profit by deviating from spq. The scenario is similar
to the one above: three buyers, with per-KB values 10, 4, and 1, and average demands 10, 10,
and 30 KBps. However, now the high and medium value buyers depart after 90 seconds, and the
low value buyer is impatient, leaving after 60 seconds if her allocation is less than 500KB, and
otherwise continuing to send for the full 600 seconds. If the seller fails to allocate at least 500KB
to the third buyer in the first minute, she misses out on forwarding extra traffic later, once the two
higher value bidders are gone. Fig. 5 shows the efficiency of bks with spq and fq routing. For
some intermediate capacities, the value-ignorant fq routing policy is better, because it results in
the low priority buyer continuing to send. Of course, if the seller knew the impatience threshold, it
could use a better hybrid strategy, allocating just enough to buyer 3 to ensure she stays, and then
allocating optimally to others.
6.3 Revenue pooling
Next, we study the effects of revenue pooling in align-trust, first looking at a simplified case
where all sellers have the same buyer distribution, and then a more complex case where there are
several seller distributions. We confirm our theoretical results, showing that the center will not
have to run a deficit, and also show that pooling reduces the variance of seller revenue. Fig. 6
shows the pooled revenue vs unpooled revenue for 200 sellers from a single distribution, with seller
capacity 40, buyers with per-KB values 2 and 3 and demand 10 KBps, a buyer with value 5 and
demand 30 KBps, and no reserve price. In addition to the primary goal of making bks faithful for
sellers, pooling drastically reduces the variance in seller revenue, with non-trivial pooled revenue
for all sellers. This also shows that the tax rate for both pools is lower than 1, as predicted by the
theory.
Fig. 7 shows the pooled revenue vs unpooled revenue for 200 sellers from four different settings:
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Figure 5: Efficiency for spq and fq when high value buyers leave early, and a low value buyer is
impatient. Deviating to fq from spq is profitable for a range of seller capacities.
seller capacities 40 or 60, and buyers with total demand 50 or 70, with higher buyer value when
demand is 70. These are indicated by different markers. Note the dramatic reduction in variance of
pooled seller revenue for each seller category: without revenue pooling, some sellers have negative
revenue while others have very high revenue. Pooling reduces this variance, while preserving the
relative ordering between seller types–sellers with higher non-pooled revenue have higher expected
pooled revenue.
7 System implementation issues
Our scheme has three main components: a protocol for buyers to send bids to the sellers, a priority
queueing facility for sellers to allocate bandwidth to buyer flows according to BKS, and a central
server for revenue pooling and accounting. We have prototyped the first two components.
An app on the buyer’s side sends bids (along with duration of validity of the bid) to a service on
the seller device. The seller device resamples the bids and uses them for allocating bandwidth, using
the standard traffic control (tc) facilities in the Linux kernel (also used by Android). Specifically,
upon receiving bids or updates to bids, the seller device sets (tc) filters to classify flows into one of a
fixed number of priority classes based on their resampled bids, which enables the kernel to enqueue
packets in the appropriate priority queue. Thus, we get efficient strict priority queuing without any
kernel modifications, with the caveat that we can only use a small fixed number of queues. This
implies that we need to round down the resampled bids to the nearest priority level. However, this
modification preserves truthfulness since the modified allocation function is still (weakly) monotone
in bids. Payments are made according to the un-rounded resampled bids.
20
Figure 6: Effect of revenue pooling when sellers are similar.
8 Conclusion
We have introduced an approach to prioritized bandwidth access in a dynamic environment. The
method succeeds in aligning incentives on both the buy-side and the sell-side of the market for
a variety of stochastic demand models. While auctions can introduce an extra burden on users
over charging a flat fee, they can provide for efficient allocation and the complexity can be hidden
through automated bidding agents [19,20].
There are many areas for future work. Natural extensions to the theory include expanding
to more expressive demand models, and considering valuation models other than linear per byte
such as value per rate and multi-dimensional valuations. The bks scheme has been extended to
handle the appropriate generalization of monotonicity through a self-sampling approach [3], and
the challenge would be design dynamic prioritization schemes that satisfy this cyclic monotonicity
property for stochastic demand models.
We make several assumptions that are useful in analysis and developing engineering insights,
even if they might not quite hold in reality. More extensive and detailed packet level simulations
would be useful to study situations where our assumptions such as natural demand models and
linear per-byte valuations do not hold. Analyzing real demand to determine the extent to which it
confirms to our models is also future work. Finally, developing our dynamic prioritization system
prototype further by designing appropriate user interfaces for eliciting buyer values, integrating
with applications to allow setting traffic values, and evaluating performance such as computational
overhead and energy consumption also remains to be done.
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